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ABSTRACT
A theoretical Unit Operational Readiness Index model is
developed after presenting a discussion concerning the implications of
military force readiness evaluation. The theoretical model is designed
around subject measurement of defined military goals. The quantifica-
tion of defined goals in the manner proposed suggests the possible use
of factor analysis techniques which are discussed. Although the model
has not been empirically tested, it endeavors to provide a conceptual
visualization of unit operational readiness evaluation and argues for
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PREFACE
The problem of evaluating the preparedness of military units to
engage in wartime operations has become a difficult and major one for
the nation's military planners. The fact that great effort is being
expended in readiness evaluation and will continue to be expended (as
long as war is possible) is in itself indicative that a final "true"
solution to the problem may never be reached in the sense that we are
able to determine exactly what our national position is with regard to
military readiness, now or in the future. Regardless of this fact, it
is imperative that we continue the search for "better" methods of
estimation. This thesis is dedicated to that end.
Concerning footnotes: Two types of footnotes are used in this
paper. The first is a superscript number following a sentence; this
refers to a page or pages from a reference source, which are listed at
the end of each chapter. The second type is the traditional reference
to the bottom of the page where amplifying information is given. These
are marked by daggers (f).
INTRODUCTION
The nature of this thesis is theoretical in its approach to the
problems of military force readiness evaluation. The purpose of the
thesis is twofold. The first purpose is to draw attention to what
continues to be an urgent need for increased capabilities in evaluation
of military readiness posture. The second purpose is to develop/offer
a method for analyzing readiness posture. In order to emphasize the
need and set it in its proper perspective, an effort has been made to
point out some of the background problems which generate the requirement
for quick-reacting military forces. This has been done by examining
briefly some of the problems encountered on the international political
scene as mankind searches for a stable world at peace. Specific emphasis
is placed upon the significance of the readiness evaluation problems
brought by the nuclear age. In addition, the endeavor has attempted to
focus on the severity of consequences of high level decision-making and
its effect upon ultimate readiness posture.
The purpose and intent of this thesis will be served if: 1) a
serious concern over the present methods of readiness evaluation is
recognized, especially at lower echelon levels, and 2) motivation is
provided for additional concentrated research and analysis in the
critical aspects of military readiness posture evaluation and how it
affects this nation's defense. Bearing these points in mind, the body
of the thesis has been divided into three chapters which relate to the
readiness evaluation problem In definite ways.
Chapter I summarizes military force readiness as a significant
factor in this nation's attempt to seek a world at peace. Chapter II
discusses some (not all) of the subtleties of the many complex problems
involved in evaluating readiness of a combat-ready military force; no
attempt is made to address specific problems or develop techniques to
yield answers as each' case, in any event, will have its own peculiarities
and hence is emphemeral. In Chapter III, a detailed description is
given of an Operational Readiness Index Model. This theoretical model
is designed to provide a general basis from which a readiness evaluation
scheme can be constructed for lower echelon military units. In doing
this it is hoped that a framework will be provided which will permit
insight into the magnitude of the various problems concerning readiness
posture evaluation on the unit level . The intent of the model is
specifically to reveal the salient features of readiness evaluation.
The following arguments, at the heart of readiness evaluation,
are underlying considerations throughout the paper:
1. The most elaborate and sophisticated piece of weaponry
designed is worth little, regardless of purchase cost, if not utilized
properly and competently. The aspect of national defense perhaps most
essential to our ultimate survival as a nation is the posture of the
military forces.
2. The second argument concerns the gravity of the commitment
that high level threat analysis places upon the nation. No matter how
efficient and capable the forces in being are, with respect to military
readiness posture, if the threat they are designed to counter has been
(even to some qualitative extent) misinterpreted, then our readiness
posture in these areas assures us nothing.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Operational readiness, its evaluation, measurement, quantifica-
tion, etc, , is intrinsically vague. Present evaluation schemes have
not in all cases achieved the desired goals. The problem dealt with in
this paper is operational readiness measurement. The following questions
were investigated in varying detail and scope concerning readiness
measurement, its purpose and methods:
1. What are the fundamental purposes of readiness measurement?
2. What are the considerations surrounding military readiness
measurement?
3. What does readiness measurement seek to determine?
4. What must readiness measurement schemes consider?
5. Are there general underlying principles or concepts present
in any determination of military readiness—regardless of
service branch, type unit, command structure, etc.?
6. What defines the concept?
7. Can it be effectively measured or quantified?
8. What constitutes the criteria involved in the determination
of operational readiness?
9. Is there a "generalized" measure of effectiveness universally
applicable to military units of all variety?
10. Can a meaningful theoretical structure (an ideal concept) be
devised that would provide insight or assistance to military




CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING THE NEED FOR
MILITARY FORCE READINESS EVALUATION
"Those who do not remember the Past
are condemned to relive it."
Santayana
MAN'S DILEMMA:
The Search for Peace in ji World on the Brink of Total War
Chapter I endeavors to re-emphasize the "why" of military readi-
ness. It is considered beneficial to set the stage properly before
probing into the matters of readiness measurement.
Central to man's problem of government is the inability of
nations to exercise self-discipline or regulation. Mankind has
apparently failed to realize that collective international well-being is
linked to individual national well-being. The impending tragedy of this
age is that time may be too short to acquire this realization. If we
are to achieve a world at peace, some form of concert of purpose among
nations must be reached. The prevailing problem is the search for
peace, but in these times it is a search for survival, the search for a
means to avoid a head-on confrontation followed by international thermo-
nuclear exchange.
Power on the International Scene
Political power has been described as essentially the ability to
make one's influence felt, particularly influence of one nation upon
another. The driving force behind sovereign nations is the desire for
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power. The problem is to find a satisfactory means of controlling and
directing this drive for power. Traditionally, there have been (at
least) two theoretical methods proposed as solutions. The first is
through national self-control of power, i.e., self-regulation of
national desires and actions. The second method takes the form of
international regulations or international law in a normative legalistic
sense. This entails a set of laws established by a legal body consisting
of representatives of member nations and enforced by a policing agency
supported by those various member nations. Both methods are influenced
by world opinion and international morality. Apparently, however, no
means of enforcing either system of control is at hand on the inter-
national political scene today. t In short, neither of the methods
spelled out appears to have much likelihood of success under present
conditions.
As far as this nation is concerned at present, two facts are
important. First, the United States is unequivocably the single most
powerful nation on earth militarily and economically. Secondly, the
United States is not so powerful that she may ignore the rest of the
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world. Hence, we in the United States are in the position of being able
to advance directly the cause of a permanent peace, and we must discover
a means to do it with the assistance of the rest of the world's powers.
In the present "bi-polar world " the direction this nation's
government has taken in an effort to find an overall solution to peace
can be described by the concepts of deterrence, arms control and
tin this regard, we mean an agency in being, at all times capable
of extracting discipline from even the most powerful single nation. The
United Nations in its present form clearly does not fall into this
category.
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disarmament. We have approached the problem (mankind's dilemma) by
endeavoring to manifest our national power in the form of deterrence,
while at the same time advocating a retreat from the arms race, in the
form of arms control and disarmament measures.
Deterrence
This nation has placed confidence in the concept of deterrence
which, as we have practiced it in this age, is composed of two aspects.
One is the determination of the nature of the threat to be deterred
along with the creation of weapon systems and forces to counter that
threat. The other aspect is concerned with the operational readiness
posture of these military systems.
Prospects
Mankind's dilemma, its most urgent problem, is to establish a
world system of nations at peace when faced with the possible alternative
of world destruction if a solution is not reached. A key element of any
workable solution will be for nations to realize that their well-being is
linked to that of other nations. This nation, in a position of world
leadership, has realized this fact and has attempted to forestall the
holocaust of nuclear war by the techniques of deterrence. The prospect
of mankind's reaching a world at peace before the commencement of a
thermonuclear exchange is therefore dependent upon:
1. This nation's maintaining its desires for a world at peace
and its willingness to exercise self-control; and
2. This nation's carefully pursuing its deterrence policy through
strategic threat analysis and military force readiness .
13
NATIONAL SECURITY
...to be successful in the international system of
this era, a nation must weld all of its national security
policies into a coherent and fully synthesized body of
doctrine. To pursue goals which are incompatible through-
strategies which are irreconcilable is to court disaster.
Though this nation may seek a world of lasting peace, we cannot
seek it at the cost of risking possible disaster. Since at present we
concurrently seek a ready posture and an arms reduction— two seemingly
incompatible objectives— the question is, how do we avoid courting
disaster?
The ultimate objective of this thesis is to analyze and discuss a
method (and the associated problems) of evaluating the readiness posture
of alert and ready military units; but to obtain a proper perspective of
the critical nature pertaining to the results of readiness evaluation,
it is necessary to examine the political forces that have tended to
generate the security requirement.
Modern history has demonstrated that regardless of the United
States' ultimate goal as a nation, there are existing forces that can be
safely controlled or diverted only by conducting our foreign policy from
a position of political and military power.
Political Scene
World War II was a testing ground for three political-
philosophical ideologies that all purported to have a solution for
ultimately achieving a stable world (although the motivations and means
of attaining that stable world were drastically different in each case!).
One of these, ultranationalism, failed that test. The remaining two
political ideologies, democracy and communism, emerged in a struggle
that is yet to be resolved.
14
World communism appears to have within its ideological development
acquired a doctrine that we as members of a democratic society may
conceivably use to advantage. The "Doctrine of Inevitability," as it has
been called, states that eventually, no matter how long it takes, the
4
world will be a communist entity! The communists are apparently willing
to wait to make their international moves. They have in their political
philosophy an ingrained willingness to accept a setback today in the
prospect of a future gain; as an example, one can cite the Cuban Missile
Crisis of 1962. This fact may be enough to permit this nation to pursue
a policy designed to await certain possible transformations within the
communist system. If we are able to remain strong enough for long
enough, then it is conceivable that a natural transformation of Soviet
governments will permit Soviet leaders of different rationale to make
re-evaluations of their objectives and ultimate goals.
There are two additional points to consider with respect to world
totalitarian philosophies as exemplified by world communism. The points
are pertinent in examining major political factors on the world scene
that affect our national security and hence direct attention to the
quality of our military defense, its systems and, particularly, its
readiness .
1. The first point to discuss is the apparent inability of total-
itarian states to perpetuate themselves in an identical form. The
problem of perpetuation can be accompanied by corruption from within,
eventual rebellion, or gradual transformation by the successors as the
previous leader's methods and concepts either fade away or are construed
for convenience. The important point is that turmoil within totalitarian
states during a power shift can be a critical period for any would-be
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enemies of that state. Hence, no matter which political direction a
powerful totalitarian regime turns to in a change of authority, a strong
U.S. military deterrent force that maintains its continuity of position
and posture will tend to have the effect of lessening the danger.
(Although, quite obviously, there is no absolute guarantee of this!)
2. Totalitarian governments have the tendency to create and main-
tain state enemies. The reason for this stems from the need of the
totalitarian to divert attention outside the nation. In essence, this
is done by creating in the masses a fear of other nations. It is this
fear and hysteria that are unleashed in the form of engagement in or
support of aggressive wars of liberation and conquest. We cite Mainland
Communist China as an example of this fact. This emphasizes the need for
the U.S. to maintain limited war capabilities.
Readiness Analysis
For the purpose of our analysis of military readiness, the point
is clear that we desire a military system that consistently maintains a
high level of readiness posture in its dual role as a deterrent force
and a limited war suppressor. The nation's security under the present
circumstances continues to need not only a force of sufficient size, but
just as importantly, one that can react effectively and quickly. The
question is, how do we ascertain the position of our units upon the
"readiness scale"?
In this assessment we have 1) discussed elements of the inter-
national political scene that both cause alarm and create a cause for
hope, but in either case the conclusions reached in the analysis have
been that an alert, quick-reacting military readiness posture is
demanded; and 2) discussed some of the aspects which lie behind our
16
national concern over deterrence and limited war capabilities. These
facts support the thesis that accurate readiness evaluation must
continue to be improved as our national policy is based on the knowledge
of it and our nation's success depends upon it. Lastly, we have implied
that military readiness evaluation is critical inasmuch as it provides a
gauge from which the nation can more effectively conduct its foreign
affairs. It provides an evaluation "in time" of our capability to
endure the cold war and the nuclear arms race as we seek a world atmos-
phere which will witness an actual reduction in the aggressiveness of
world communist policy and orientation. By maintaining military




The primary role of the United States armed forces is the mainte-
nance of a capable and competent deterrent force which can extract so
severe a penalty for an initial nuclear attack that would-be aggressors
conclude any such risk is entirely unprofitable.
The second role of our armed forces is to provide a capability
for thwarting local wars of limited nature when these wars demonstrate
that they are in direct conflict with the overall objectives of world
peace and are a direct threat to this nation.
t
Our concern is with these two military roles and the readiness
evaluations that indicate the prospects of accomplishing the roles.
tThe determination of what constitutes a "limited war in conflict
with our interests and security" is another matter and will not be
discussed here.
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In this analysis the fact has emerged that our military forces
can no longer envision their mission in the static sense. The rapid
development of sophisticated weaponry and the fluidity of international
politics, constantly shifting and re-orienting direction and alliance,
have dictated that the United States armed forces execute their
planning in a similar manner. By this we mean that there is a
continuing requirement for looking at the nation's military force in
"dynamic" terms. The hydrogen bomb is the weapon of our age but who is
to say that it will always be so! "Dynamic thinking" in the military
sense will permit us to have open minds with regard to strategies,
tactics, techniques and the distribution of force to cover contingencies.
Dynamic thinking will assist in arriving at the balance of systems
—
qualitatively and quantitatively—necessary to pursue the military's
dual role as the instrument of deterrence and the instrument for mini-
mizing the lethality of local wars. Dynamic thinking in threat analysis
will ensure every possibility of arriving at conclusions that are not
blocked by preconception, which in turn will tend to enhance overall
readiness posture-
Deterrent System , The military role of deterrence is today the
most critical. In the deterrent system, two points are germane:
1. Nuclear retaliation capability that approaches 100%. (This
implies successful launch of the proper numbers of weapons that can
penetrate any anti-ballistic missile systems and score the planned
level of destruction.)
2. Quick reaction to aggressor-initiated nuclear exchange, i.e.,
instant retaliation. (This in turn implies a "high" level of military
force readiness.)
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Limited War System . The military's second role is to provide a
limited war capability in order that "so-called" limited size conflicts
do not become unlimited, i.e., militarily speaking, limited wars are
waged to stop the spread of the aggression which precipitated them.
This second role calls for a diversity of equipment and skills through-
out every branch of service. The emphasis must be placed on a balanced
force capable of exercising a maximum of strategic and tactical flexi-
bility which is kept at the peak of readiness posture. The local war
can be characterized by the following:
1. New types of weapon systems.
2. New types of combat organizations.
3. New machines to enhance mobility.
4. Superior systems of locating enemy positions.
5. High quality personnel completely trained in the new combat
techniques.
These points dictate the need for a readiness evaluation scheme
of the highest capacity for posture measurement.
Men and Machines
Just asthe Nation's security is served by the military forces
so the military forces are served by men and machines. It is the proper
choices of the numbers and types of men and machines that will have a
direct bearing on our success, but it is even more important that these
men and machines have been properly integrated. It is the efficiency
with which the various components are brought into a harmoniously
operating entity that is vital. In short, combat effectiveness is
19
mandatory. We are asking for dedicated, professional militarists, men
who are capable, competent and highly skilled.
t
Factors of Readiness
The analysis conducted has shown these factors influencing mili-
tary force readiness:
1. Accurate strategic threat analysis
.
2. Instant readiness (as opposed to mobilization potential).
3. Combat effectiveness .
4. Professional character (the benefit of experience from career
personnel)
.
5. Qualitative superiority (equipment types and unit organiza-
tion) .
6. Quantitative sufficiency (numbers and types).
7. Flexibility (strategic and tactical usage of units within
systems forces)
.




(Each item will normally enter an operational readiness posture evalua-
tion scheme in some sense, if only implicitly.)
SUMMARY
Chapter I has discussed military force readiness in its relation
to this nation's defense. The points discussed highlighted those aspects
of the international scene with which the nation's military must contend,
tWe note that the armed forces of the United States suffer much




viz., deterrence and limited war. Emphasis has been placed upon the
fact that military force readiness is the sine qua non of this nation's
security in the nuclear age. The following considerations are pertinent
to readiness evaluation:
1. Threat analysis , which is determined by the ramifications of
events on the international political and military scene, will be the
influencing factor upon ultimate readiness postures obtained.
2. Weapon system analysis
,
or cost estimating that determines
choice among weapons and personnel requirements, is necessary for planning
and economic reasons but will not by itself determine a given readiness
level.
3. The sophisticated machines and techniques of this era demand
a sophisticated dynamic system of readiness posture evaluation . We
should not permit the potential capability of systems and machines to
be considered more important than the capabilities of the men who
command them.
FIGURE 1.1 is a diagram depicting military force readiness eval-
uation with respect to discussion of Chapter I. The "influence lines"
show dependence of the receiving block upon contents of the originating
block. "Input lines" are deterministic in the sense that the receiving
block is forced into an action by the originating block. The "pickoff
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The discussion developed in this chapter is directed at empha-
sizing certain aspects that surround military force readiness and
posture measurement. None of the particular points addressed here are
presented as new ideas by themselves. Rather, the objective is to
emphasize their collective influence upon readiness posture. It is not
meaningful to discuss or in any sense measure readiness posture (on any
level) unless we know what we are attempting to measure, and more
fundamentally, why we are measuring it.
Determination of the Nature and Extent of the Threat
The need for the vast military forces has created serious prob-
lems of management (in the sense of overall guidance and control) . For
our purposes, however, there is only one aspect of the complex manage-
ment problem we wish to address and that is threat analysis. Our con-
cern is with the high level decisions that result in the various defense
plans and weapon systems programs.
These are the decisions which result in directing or orienting
the military forces toward their objectives or missions. Similarly, we
will find that threat analysis (for example, analysis of enemy tactics)
conducted at the lower echelon levels when relating to readiness evalua-
tion schemes will affect unit training objectives. The extent to which
this analysis helps or hinders readiness posture is, of course,
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dependent upon the accuracy of the threat analysis. The point is that
such threat analysis is critical as an input to any type of readiness
measurement scheme.
Gaming Aspects . Strategic threat analysis involves a multitude
of philosophical, politicalt, technological and economic factors, each
of which enters specific analysis in varying degrees. In toto, threat
analysis takes on the characteristics of classical game theory, where
numerous participants, with various objectives, seek collectively or
separately to secure their goals. Final estimates of enemy capabilities
and potential threats are determined by considering the action an enemy
is likely to take, but the situation is cyclic for his decisions and
actions are based on what we do, etc. These problems are extremely
complicated at the strategic level and are difficult even at the unit
level. They are nevertheless obviously investigated in detail to
develop an insight to the problem as it exists. The point we emphasize
is that, in a similar manner at lower echelon analysis of readiness
evaluation schemes, the gaming aspects of threat analysis should provide
insight to the development of new tactics, stimulate innovation in
operational planning, and provide the units with the widest possible
flexibility in pursuing their mission.
Underlying Philosophies . The treatment of threat analysis at
higher levels would normally include as many ramifications of the
pertinent political and ideological philosophies as necessary. At the
lower level and in particular for unit readiness evaluation purposes,
detailed attention should be given to the lesser philosophical aspects
f'Political" includes its extension into the military arena.
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as they pertain to enemy tactics and habit patterns concerning enemy
problem solving, e.g., the Oriental proclivity for human sacrifice as a
substitute for technological skill.
The Scientific Approach . Estimating and establishing the enemy
threat is the starting point from which additional command or unit
problem areas are often discovered. The value of a scientific approach
to threat estimations by both high and low level staffs should be
obvious. Particular attention should be given to this concept by low
level staffs developing readiness measurement schemes where the tenden-
cies to "approximate" or "omit" for convenience may be strong.
Sound analysis should include, in general:
1. Determining purposes or objectives.
2. Establishing measures of effectiveness.
3. Obtaining and analyzing data.
4. Determining solutions.
5. Evaluating and criticizing results.
2
6. Correcting deficiencies.
The Commitment of Resources
The national resources invested in defense demand that every
attention be given to proper utilization of manpower and materials in
3
order to avoid waste. A partial solution can be provided by augmented
readiness evaluation schemes which properly direct unit objectives and
missions, thereby helping to reduce waste, e.g., establishing opera-
tional maximum expenditures as well as minimums in appropriate situations,
Readiness measurement schemes should be capable of assisting in the
proper utilization of allocated resources.
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Military Posture ; Use of Men and Machines
The Need to Measure Readiness Posture Effectively
. Chapter I
stated the necessity and purposes of the military forces. If their
objectives and purposes are to be obtained arid fulfilled, the most
efficient way to do so is by establishing some method or scheme that
allows reoccurring comparisons between performance and goals. By
comparison of given goals with force posture or performance, necessary
corrective action can be taken to upgrade the forces to the desired
readiness status which has been previously specified by "high level"
threat analysis.
Results Desired from Readiness Evaluation . Certain results
should be obtainable from military readiness evaluation schemes. These
are fundamentally the following:
1. Point evaluations , which depict the posture of a unit or
force at a certain specified period.
2. Trend analysis, which permits a comparative analysis of force
stature over a specified duration, (This may entail some type of histo-
gram, which records pertinent readiness information to predict rates of
changes, general posture development in critical areas, etc.)
3. Feedback , which essentially entails a flow of information
from units or forces back through the readiness analyzing staff to the
strategic threat analysis and planning levels.
Dynamic Measurement . In Chapter I, emphasis was directed toward
the concept of "dynamic thinking," which amounts to maintaining a con-
stant vigil on the evolution of military matters and . indeed on those
fundamental political domains behind the military. An extension of this
28
concept should be applied to military posture evaluation schemes.
Generally, "dynamic measurement" as applied to evaluation schemes
entails systematic updating of the scheme, periodic re-evaluation of
underlying concepts, a general flow of data and information in the form
of suggestions for improvement, correction, or re-direction of effort
for units concerned.
SUMMARY
Chapter II has briefly discussed some of the important aspects
of the function of a military force which any readiness evaluation
scheme must attempt to measure, viz., 1) capability to counter the
threat; 2) expenditure of allocated resources; and 3) use of men and
machines. The purpose has been to direct attention to those problems
as they relate to readiness evaluation schemes, not to solve them or
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SECTION 1
1.1. BACKGROUND
Chapter I discussed briefly that the world environment imposes
definite requirements upon the U.S. for maintaining a versatile and
effective military force. The rapidly changing developments indicate
the requirement for readiness evaluation schemes that produce reasonably
reliable estimates of readiness posture on a continuing basis. Chapter
II discussed some of the problems regarding measurement of readiness.
Readiness measurement information is desired for reoccurring comparisons
of current military postures versus optimum readiness levels. This is
done so that adequate corrective actions can be taken by operational
commanders to assure unit progress toward the desired readiness level.
The problems involved with operational readiness evaluation are
multiple and complex. Even the lowest level of readiness evaluation
may cause problems for the analyst if proper care is not taken in
identifying the functional qualities to be measured in a military unit
as those qualities relate to the assigned mission. It is necessary to
determine the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the unit's mission
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prior to determining which of the unit's functional qualities need
measuring, e.g., one identifies what the target types are likely to be
prior to deciding the importance of practicing some weapon tactic over
another! Inherent subjective factors are imbedded within the evaluation
of military force posture. Subjective factors emerge primarily as
"value judgments" concerning decisions, estimations and the importance
(merit) of specific events. Subjectivity is present in the very first
phases of strategic threat analysis and remains as a consideration
throughout the analysis of the military system to the final evaluation
scheme.
1.2 OBJECTIVE
The objective of Chapter III is to develop a framework and
theoretical model for lower echelon operational readiness evaluation.
"Lower echelon" is defined to pertain to the more common and numerous
types of military units. (Examples are the Air Force and Navy aircraft
squadrons, Army and Marine Corps regiments, battalions, etc.) In
general, "lower echelon" pertains specifically to those units of the
military forces that exist at lower organizational levels. (Throughout
Chapter III a Navy ASW squadron will be used as an illustrative vehicle.
No particular type aircraft is to be inferred. The examples given are
not to be construed as results of an analysis but merely as illustra-
tions of notions involved. This caveat cannot be too strongly empha-
sized . The reader is encouraged to consider conditions similar to his
own experience.)
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For the purpose of illustration in this chapter, we define a
"generalized command structure," consisting of three levels. t The three
levels are 1) High Level Command (denoted HC) , a command having the
responsibility of specifying "broad mission objectives" to subordinates,
e.g., high level strategic threat analysis is conducted at this level;
2) Major Command (denoted MC) , a command having "operational" or "TYPE"
control over lower echelon subordinate units. MC will have various
areas of responsibility, e.g., (pertaining to Naval aircraft squadrons)
MC will perhaps embrace multi-TYPE aircraft in multi-PURPOSE roles, i.e.,
ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) , VF (Fighter), VA (Attack), VR (Transport),
Helicopter, AIRGROUP, WING, etc.; 3) Lower Echelon Unit Command of TYPE
"T", the command for which the Index is developed (the "K " Unit Com-
(T)
mand of TYPE "T" is denoted UC_;
,
where there are "n " Unit Commands of
K 1




The importance of the definition is reflected in that emphasis
is placed upon the relationship within the command structure and how
each of the command levels can influence operational readiness. The
(T)
UC ' has control over a limited set of functions (operations, etc.)
K
which are essentially a subset of those held in the MC. MC is controlled
in its broader mission by the direction of HC.
The mission of MC is to maintain an operationally-ready combat
force so that national "victory" in combat can be achieved. tt In order
tThe clear-cut distinctions between levels of command, and for
that matter between the staff analysts and decision makers, that are
assumed in this paper, obviously, do not necessarily exist in the mili-
tary force structure in the same exact sense.
tt"Victory" has taken on different meaning since the advent of
the thermonuclear weapon. The victor may have little more left after
war than the vanquished.
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to carry out this mission, the MC has to insure itself that the Unit
Commands attached are at all times ready to carry out wartime combat
(T)
missions. Just as UC ' is limited in its alternatives to carry out its
mission (UC has only its allotted "men and machines"), so also is MC
limited in the courses of action (alternatives) available to carry out
its broader mission (MC has only the various assigned Unit Commands).
In effect, HC determines the entire course of events. It is assumed
that the force levels, numbers and types of men and machines, etc., have
(T)been specified for MC (and hence, UC^ ) by results of HC strategicK
threat analysis. It becomes MC's duty to carry out its assigned mission
within the constraints imposed by HC. Heuristically , in consideration
of its mission, MC maximizes expected success of the mission subject to
the constraints imposed by HC.
In the typical case considered here, there will be numerous UC's,
all with identical or similar missions, functioning with similar weapon
systems, equipment, etc.
Since there exists (throughout the military forces) a variety of
definitions of operational readiness, it shall be defined here to
provide agreement within the context of this theoretical approach (model)
to readiness measurement.
Define OPERATIONAL READINESS :
OP.R. = The condition or status of any military unit (or
force) with regard to its capability or capacity to
carry out the duly assigned operational mission (and/or
objectives) and as such is broadly considered a function
of that mission. OPERATIONAL READINESS describes, in an
overall sense, the capability (capacity) for a unit to
carry out its mission, though that mission may consist
of several distinct parts.
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(It is to be noted that, in general, Unit missions are defined in broad
terms.) Readiness is a state of being and as such implies that a tran-
sitional process exists in that readiness at a given period may or may
not be identical with that of a previous or subsequent period.
As a result of the above definition the term "POSTURE" is apropos
in that it pertains to a particular "state of readiness" at a point in
time.
1.3. QUANTIFICATION : AN INDEX OF READINESS POSTURE
The objective of the Operational Readiness Index is to quantify
Unit posture. A specific number or set of numbers compactly describing
military force posture is considered useful.
Chapter II stated the desired results of readiness evaluation.
Quantification of posture can directly assist commanders and planners
in pursuing assigned missions e Trends can be observed on Unit develop-
ment. An evaluation scheme properly devised could observe problem pat-
terns which are common among Units as they develop, e.g., personnel
qualification problems may imply problems in training techniques,
schooling, or even personnel retention. In the optimum state an evalua-
tion scheme gives this sort of results plus direct comparisons among
Units of the same TYPE,
The ranking of Units for competitive purposes is a natural result
of a quantified readiness evaluation scheme and could give judges (com-
manders) sufficient data to decide winners of various awards, e.g.,
safety and combat efficiency (E) awards.
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1.4. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE INDEX TO BE DEVELOPED
The purposes, desirability and objectives of readiness posture
evaluation have previously been elucidated. A brief description of the
Operational Readiness Index follows.
The Operational Readiness Index model envisions an Operations
Analysis staff analyzing the "HC-MC-UC" relationship for the particular
"Unit TYPE" that the Index model is being constructed. Thorough staff
research is directed toward the various aspects of the MC's mission or
objective and the UC role in supporting that mission or objective.
Quantitative and qualitative aspects are examined in detail by the
analyzing staff in order to develop fully the orientation of the UC mis-
sion. After complete analysis of the MC mission, attention can then be
directed toward the UC, as its mission is, by this stage, coordinated
with that of the MC.
1.4. A. READINESS FACTORS . With the UC mission clearly defined,
the next "objective" in OP.R. Index development is to obtain the FACTORS
of the UC that describe its operational readiness capability.
t
Define FACTOR :
F. = A basic or fundamental "function" (or operation) that
significantly influences (reflects) the Unit Command's
performance with respect to operational readiness. The
la
(T)
subscript "i" sequences the FACTORS pertaining to UO; .
tThough the next "objective" for the Index is obtaining FACTORS,
this may, in given circumstances, be the end result of several major
intermediate steps. This fact will be fully discussed at a later stage
in Section 2.2 after an illustration has been given. FACTORS are defined
at this stage because they will ultimately be the means of compactly
expressing information concerning readiness posture.
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F
€ d ' where <y is the universal set of all FACTORS
that can significantly influence (reflect) operational
readiness.
Examples of FACTORS (for a Navy ASW squadron) might be: F : Squadron
Operations; F„ : Aircraft Maintenance; F : Squadron Personnel. FACTORS
consist of ELEMENTS.
I.4.B. READINESS ELEMENTS . FACTORS are operationally described
by ELEMENTS, i.e., the occurrence (or existence) of an ELEMENT "explains,"
to "some" extent, the capability (characteristics) of a FACTOR.
Define ELEMENT :
(T)
e.. = The objectives or goals assigned to or defined for UC ;
ij
(T)
they may take the form of a requirement on UC that
must be accomplished during a given time period or they
may be qualification levels that must be maintained
during a given time period. For e.., the subscript "i"
associates the ELEMENT with the FACTOR F. and the letter
1
"j" subscripts the ELEMENTS belonging to a FACTOR (F )
,
but "j" does not necessarily run sequentially, e.g., one
may have e^, e16> e±9 versus e^, e^, e13 ,
etc.
It is to be noted that it may not always be possible for a Unit Command
to completely accomplish (or comply with) some particular goal (e..)
during any one given time period due to various external circumstances
that may develop. Note also that ELEMENTS form sets and are not
considered a matrix- In some discussions in the literature of military
readiness the term "indicators" is used in the same context as ELEMENTS.
As each ELEMENT may (not a necessary condition) describe capa-
bility in one or more FACTORS, a symbolic notation may be used, but
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before defining the notation an example is called for. Let e. Q be an10
ELEMENT defined as: e.
fi
= X number of ASW flight hours required to be
flown by a Navy ASW squadron per month. It seems intuitively clear that
e.g should reflect capability in at least the two FACTORS (previously
given for the ASW squadron) F.. = Squadron Operations and F_ = Aircraft
Maintenance. Then in this case i=l and i=2; therefore, e1Q=eOQ . Thelo Zo
results of this example can be generalized by a modified form of set
notation given symbolically by (F.:e..) where the i and j are the same
as given above. The ELEMENTS can form overlapping sets (but this is not
a necessary condition)
.
FIGURE 3.1 should clarify these notions of ELEMENTS. e..£ £
where £ is the universal set of all "l" ELEMENTS which define objectives
or goals. Examples of ELEMENTS (pertaining to a Navy ASW squadron)
might be: Number of pilots qualified in ASW tactics; Navigation and
instrument hours per month per pilot; Number of ASW weapon exercises
conducted per month per flight crew; etc.
As an illustrative example of the fundamental notions of FACTORS
and ELEMENTS, consider the following:
Let F
1
= ASW squadron operations capability; e.
1
= X number of
pilots qualified in ASW tactics; e.. „ = Y number of ASW Weapon Exercises
conducted per month per flight crew; e , = Z number of required naviga-
tion/instrument hours per month per pilot. In this example one could
specify (employing the notation above) that (F :e , e12 , e,,) gives
some "reflection" of ASW squadron operations capability. Referring to
the definition of an ELEMENT e.. it can be seen that e,. is the defini-
tion of a qualification level that is to be maintained. As pilots are
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L: the total number of all.. EltfSMENIS
r: the total number of all FACTORS
FIGURE 3.1
An arbitrary example of FACTORS being described by sets
of ELEMENTS. A particular ELEMENT may appear in dif-
ferent sets. This is not meant to imply a matrix,






to maintain this, defined level (e ni ) will fluctuate. Similarly, e., and
e.. , define goals assigned to the squadron which they may or may not be
able to achieve during the allotted time period for various external
considerations over which the squadron has no control. Whether or not a
squadron has control over the circumstances surrounding the accomplish-
ment of an ELEMENT is of no consequence to the Operational Readiness
Index. We are explicitly interested in "measuring" the operational
readiness posture of the Unit Commands. Of course, it will be of the
gravest concern to the Major Command why the Unit Commands are unable
to comply with (or accomplish) the defined requirements. The ramifica-
tions of the events surrounding unsatisfactory performance would,
normally, as a consequence, reveal what external considerations or
circumstances have prevented the Unit Command from exhibiting "satisfac-
tory" performance.
One final note concerning the notation of the ELEMENTS. Although
the subscript "i" will be carried forward in Section 1 to represent the
fact that an ELEMENT may belong to more than one FACTOR, the "i" does
not imply different ELEMENTS. ELEMENTS are indexed by the subscript
"j" alone.
I.4.C. VALUATION. As the e.. are definitions of objectives,
ij
(T)
goals or levels that UC^ attempts to achieve or maintain (as appropri-
K
ate) they should lend themselves to exact numerical quantification (as
in the examples given in I.4.B.). Let us assume that "somehow" the e..
can be assigned values (weights)t according to their importance in F..
tSince a variety of definitions exists in the literature of
Decision Theory and Utility Theory regarding weights, values, etc., we
choose interchangeably to describe the "value" of an ELEMENT successfully
accomplished as having a specified "weight."
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It is only reasonable and logical to assume that there will be varying
degrees of importance among the ELEMENTS. Some e.. will be more
important with respect to OP.R. than others and hence will have higher
value (greater weight). In the second example of Section I.4.B., let
us assume that we are able to determine the values (weights) that are
associated with e , e „ , e , if they are totally satisfied, e.g., let
"n" be the numerical value awarded to the squadron (for e.
..
) if there
were X number of pilots qualified in ASW tactics as required, and
similarly, values associated with e, „ and e,,. In short, once definitions
have been established concerning the e.., the attention of the analysts
can be directed toward determining the "values" for ELEMENTS. Valuation
will be discussed further in Section 2.4 where reference to Appendix I
will be made. Before providing an illustration of the Operational
Readiness Index a definition of the "value" for e.. will be given.
ij
Define VALUE of an ELEMENT ;
(T).
v. = The numerical weight awarded to the Unit Command (UC )
J K-
for totally (100%) successful accomplishment of a defined
ELEMENT e.. during the time period allotted. The sub-
script "j" corresponds.
The definition explicitly omits the subscript "i" because it is an ulti-
mate objective to "divide" the VALUE (v.) awarded for successfully
accomplishing e.., so that v. is distributed among the various FACTORS
F. to which e.. belongs. Specifically, the definition has not in itself
prescribed the method in which the VALUES (v.) will be distributed among
the FACTORS. This will be discussed in detail at a later stage.
Referring to FIGURE 3.1, v.'s corresponding to e..'s are depicted along
the bottom of the figure.
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I.4.D. ILLUSTRATION . Prior to giving an illustration of the
Index model of this paper it will be meaningful to describe its under-
lying notion. In FIGURE 3.2 is given a plot of two dimensions F and
F„ (FACTORS). These are coordinate axes for the operational readiness
"domain" as shown. The figure is topographical in the sense that F.. and
F_ are similar to coordinates of a military map and the terrain (readi-
ness) levels are given isometrically. As one proceeds to higher levels
(R
1
to R-, etc.) increased operational readiness is reached. The
"optimum condition" is shown at the highest level. In order to measure
(locate) our position in the readiness domain it is necessary to devise
"some satisfactory method" for determining (approximating) the reference
system involved. We seek, (at least in theory) some method of obtaining
information concerning the F's as they will indicate our coordinates
(location) in the readiness domain. An optimal readiness state is shown
as a subset of the readiness domain "R . n ." Additionally, a minimumoptimal J
acceptable condition is shown as "R
. .
." These are the general
minimum
underlying notions of this particular readiness evaluation scheme.
At this point we have sufficient notation and definitions to
discuss the fundamental concept of the Operational Readiness Index. We
do this at an early stage so that subsequent discussion of the Index
scheme can be considered in light of this heuristic illustration.
Let us assume for purposes of a specific illustration (of
reduced scope) that the important "functions" (FACTORS) pertaining to
operational readiness for a Navy ASW squadron (UC ' ; K=l,...,n
(hereafter dropping the ASW subscript)) are specified as F.. , F and
F~ where:
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F = OPERATIONS (OPS) e =No . Pilots Qualified in ASW Tactics
e.. =Weapon Exercises Conducted
e =Crews Qualified in ASW
F
2
= MAINTENANCE (MNT) e
2
=Average A/C Availability
e0/ =Average A/C Mission Aborts24
e„,=Mech/Tech Qualified for A/C Maint./o
F e PERSONNEL (PERS) e =Crews Qualified in ASW
e =Mech/Tech Qualified for A/C Maint.
JO
Therefore, (using the previous notation) the following sets are obtained:
(Fl
:eH» ei2' e15^ ' ( F2 :e23' e24' e26^ ' and ^F3 :e35' e36^ * In this
illustration (arbitrary) , the fifth and sixth ELEMENTS each influence two
FACTORS. One observes that, in this case, some part (percent) of the
VALUE v would logically be awarded to F. and F„. Each "function" of
the squadron has defined a FACTOR which influences operational readiness
and, therefore, _if_ a measurement can be taken (over a given time period)
on the FACTORS, it will reflect the squadron's operational readiness
during that period.
The Operational Readiness Index is developed from the following
argument. To discuss OP.R., as defined in Section 1.2, one must look
at the capability of the ASW squadron (UC ) to prosecute the ASW
mission of the Fleet Commander (MC) . The implication is that the ASW
squadron must be highly proficient in the utilization of men and equip-
ment. Now, if we form a triple of the FACTORS, (F , F , F.) , and
assume that we are able to measure this triple during a given time
period we would obtain a "measured (numerical) triple" (F ' , F ' , F ').
We will call (F
,
F 9 , F ) a defining triple while the primed F's will
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"measured quantities." (F,', F ', F ' ) will "reflect" the ASW squadron's
capability to prosecute the Fleet Commander's ASW mission (and hence its
own) as long as it approaches or exceeds some prescribed level. Call
this prescribed level (starred F's) the "attainable triple" (F *, F *,
F *) , i.e., it is an optimum state for each FACTOR. We seek to define
the Operational Readiness Index in terms of the prescribed level and
eventually compare (F ' , F„
'
, F ' ) to it using suitable criteria (that
will be suggested at a later stage in Section 2.6.C) to determine if
the squadron is OPERATIONALLY READY. This is in keeping with the dis-
cussion of Chapter II.
If the FACTORS can be assumed to represent (essentially) independ-
ent functions of the squadron, then one can interpret them on a
geometric basis, considering each FACTOR as an axis in space. Specif-
ically, in the ASW squadron example the "defining" triple (F
1
, F», F„)
can be considered as defining a three-dimensional FACTOR (F.) space,
i.e., they define the axes of the space. (In the general case
(F,„... ,F ) defines an r-space.)
We may now state that the triples referred to above as
(F ' , F ', F M and (F *, F *, F *) are scalar triples that are
measurable; the former is the squadron's readiness posture reported at
the end of a reporting period while the latter is an optimum readiness
state. These scalar triples define vectors in the context of a three-
dimensional space (as above) . Therefore, define
R
(ASW)
E The OPERATIONAL READINESS INDEX for the ASW squadron
opt
/T_(ASW), _. ,.„.(UC^ ), an optimum condition,K




"t" (the time at which the READINESS REPORT is made to
the Major Command).
1(ASW > = (F - F . F •)t\ K *l *2 ' *3 ;
If the F. can be assumed independent then from commonly used vector






The methods for obtaining the scalar quantities (F.' and F,*)
will be developed at a later stage (Section 2.6); it should suffice for
now to state that the scalars will be a mathematical function of the v.
3
(which were defined in Section 1.4.C).
From vector algebra, a vector may be represented by a scalar
multiplied times a "unit vector" that orients direction. Also any
vector may be represented by a linear sum of scalars multiplied times
unit length "dimension" vectors. Let f . be a unit length dimension
vector on the "i " orthogonal axis of an r-space (where the circumflex
denotes "unit" length) . By analogy and in the specific illustration
concerning the ASW squadron, the OPERATIONAL READINESS POSTURE of the




+ , + ,J (where the F.' aretK XIzzjj i
measured in FACTOR "i").
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= I F.*f. (where the F.* are theopt *• 1 i ii=l
optimum scalar quantities
that each squadron attempts
to achieve)
.
To determine whether or not the ASW squadron is OPERATIONALLY
READY at the time period "t" one compares the squadron's POSTURE rA SW)
to the OPERATIONAL READINESS INDEX r^
ASW\ As the defined optimum readi-
opt. r
ness condition (state) of a military unit may or may not be obtainable
during a time period "At" for which the unit's posture is to be assessed,
yet the unit still performs to be an acceptable level, it is necessary
to define a minimum acceptable POSTURE level . To do this we can employ
a symbolic notation of a vector function. If "h" is a vector function,
then one can define the minimum acceptable POSTURE level for the Unit





Clearly, R . may be a scalar, vector, set of vectors, cone, surface,
' min J
etc., depending upon the function "h". (As an arbitrary example of a
vector function, "h" could be the function that directs all scalar
coefficients of the f. defining R _ to be reduced by 25%; in
l opt
this case R . is a vector.) In a similar manner one may define
min
a vector function "g" for rA that permits comparison of R
and rA in an appropriate manner. For example, "g" could
permit comparison of scalars, or "g" might permit one to establish
whether the vector rA lies within the volume of a cone or
some other surface defined by R . . The two functions "h" and "g"J mm
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are vector functions which define the appropriate comparisons of unit
POSTURE with the INDEX. Then if
g(J^
ASW)
) satisfies all conditions defined by h(l (ASW) ), UC^ASW)




, +ASW). , . . . - ., .... , c . . , u/*(ASWh TT„(ASW)g( Rl ) does not satisfy all conditions defined by h(R ), UC.:
t K Opt K
is NOT READY .
FIGURE 3.3 depicts the notions of this section and gives an
D (ASW) .... .. , . . . .. . ^(ASW)R
.
condition which is a rectangular volume defined on Rmm ° opt
g( R^
L
) states that R^ must be a vector with origin at (0,0,0)




The objective of the foregoing discussion and illustration has
been to describe heuristically the fundamental concept of the OP.R Index
so that the following discussion of the analysis which surrounds Index
development will be more meaningful.
1.5. THE MILITARY SYSTEM AS AN ENTITY ; COMMANDS-UNITS
1.5. A. ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS . The first step toward development
of the OP.R. Index consists of a thorough and detailed analysis of the
military system involved. The staff analysts will need information
concerning:
1. Chain of command (and administration procedures)





R shows the optimal OP.rt.
opt r
condition.





.RV "' shows a Unit deficient in Fp
^2 shows a "READY" Unit.
Plotted R values for successive time periods "At" can
exhibit trends in each FACTOR B^, Fp, and F*.
Note: In general, the three coordinates F-,*, Fp* , and
F-z* need not be equal.
FIGURE 3.3
Dimensional Visualization of the
OPERATIONAL R^ADINESo INDEX, R(T)opt
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5. Inter-unit relationships
6. Weapon system (ordnance) characteristics
7. Operation-planning procedures
8. Resource (funds) allocations
9. Information (data) flow (networks); intelligence procedures
within the system
10. Personnel training procedures
11. Maintenance-supply-logistics procedures
12. Others (as pertinent in specific cases)
If the system is complex, it may be desirable to develop diagrams
for 1) organization, 2) communications, and 3) command and control
features, utilizing the techniques of cybernetics and organization
analysis. This in itself implies developing a model of the system .
I.5.B. FEEDBACK , Since the MC desires to know when discrepancies
exist between the posture of the units and the desired readiness levels,
it is imperative that the OP.R. Index scheme incorporate mechanisms for
feedback of information concerning the mission, goals, objectives, etc.
Implicit here is the requirement for analysts developing an Index to
incorporate self-correcting procedures into the Index documentation that
will facilitate corrective feedback concerning the Index as well as unit
posture,
1. Command and Control . Every technique available should be
utilized to establish properly a command and control relationship from
MC through the OP.R. Index to the UC. However, the objective is to
orient properly the Unit Command's operational endeavors, not to reduce
(minimize or degrade) the responsibility and authority of unit commanding
officers and subordinates in any sense.
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2. Thinking System . The Index should enhance the military
organization by stimulating a consciousness within unit personnel to
regard the system as a whole. Conscious learning can be realized when
units begin to practice innovation. We desire a state where constant
improvement is sought as Unit Command personnel seek to converge their
Index rating into the optimal. By devising a scheme of periodic
comparisons with a defined optimum we introduce self-competition. This
helps to avoid such pitfalls as faulty direction, poor management,
improper planning, failure to investigate new methods, etc. In short,
we desire to inject "dynamic thinking" into the Unit Command level.
1.5.C READINESS INDEX CONTRIBUTIONS . A fully augmented Index
scheme developed under the auspices of ' HC and MC with support from the
UC's should both enhance readiness- evaluation and provide stimulus for
innovation as increasingly superior performance is sought. The Index
scheme is envisioned as being an integral part of a system that continues
to define objectives and enhance performance.
1.6. SUMMARY OF SECTION 1
Before proceeding to the detailed analysis of OP.R. Index develop-
ment it is necessary to consolidate the discussion of Section 1 as
follows
:
1. Threat analysis conducted by the HC has determined the mission
of MC and UC, specifying weapon systems and establishing the manning
levels.
2. Staff analysts developing the OP.R. Index utilize the defined
mission of MC (and UC) to initiate analysis of FACTORS, ELEMENTS, etc.
3. Analysis staff action identifies all necessary parameters of
the Index from data collected on MC and UC.
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4. The OP.R. Index orients operational performance to achieve
desired MC mission and objectives.
5. Resulting unit performance (POSTURE) is compared with desired
(optimal) results for:
a. Organization correction of discrepancies.
b. Further threat analysis (case where existing system is
not capable of meeting defined threat)
.
FIGURE 3.4 shows in block diagram form the interactions of an
Index analysis.
FIGURE 3.5 shows the OP.R. Index in a functioning state.
SECTION 2
2.1 READINESS MEASUREMENT
We have outlined "what" we are attempting to measure. The
desired result is a compact quantification of readiness POSTURE that
contains maximum information. As the staff analysis proceeds and
ELEMENTS are defined for UC they will be, in the general case, incommen-
surable quantities. There is no known ratio scale that will permit
direct comparisons of the incommensurables. This problem is circum-
vented by the use of VALUES (v.). We associate with each e.. a
corresponding weight or VALUE, e.g., it is worth VALUE (v.) toward
operational readiness for completely satisfying e...
2.2 OBTAINING FACTORS
The previous illustration of the ASW squadron ( supra , Section
1.4.D) along with the definition of a FACTOR describe a "functional
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In the theory of this Index model an appeal will be made (at a later
stage in Section 2.5) to the scientific methods of FACTOR ANALYSIS .
The appeal is derived from the need to distribute the VALUE v. of an
ELEMENT e.. among the FACTORS (F.), since we have seen that a particular
(T)ELEMENT may describe the capability of the UC^ in one or more FACTORS.
K
As has been stated in the opening discussion of Section 1.3, we desire
to arrive at a number or set of numbers that contain a great amount of
information, i.e., for any one number or "small" set of numbers that
satisfy predetermined conditions, we (e.g., the Major Command) may be
reasonably assured that the desired level of operational readiness is
being maintained. The objective is to display as compactly as is
reasonable the POSTURE of all military units.
In defining (designating) FACTORS (F.) by means of factor
analysis, we must assume that ELEMENTS can be defined by the analysts
and that batteries of investigations, surveys, questionnaires, etc., (as
appropriate) can be designed to obtain the v. in such a manner that the
results are consistent with the compilation of data (called "test
scores" in the literature) as in factor analysis. The FACTORS (F.) as
defined for this model will in general be considered as being strictly
those broad functions of the Unit Command which most directly influence
readiness capabilities. Depending upon the method of factor analysis
used in the case being considered (since there are several methods
fitting various circumstances), the statement is made that FACTORS (F.),
in general , would be completely defined (or designated) after a final
analysis of ELEMENTS and VALUES v..
Having made this broad statement concerning factor analysis, we
note that conversely one may establish a hypothesis that certain FACTORS
exist and then establish the correctness of the hypothesis under
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empirical data. It is in this sense that the use of factor analysis is
proposed in this model. One (of several) means of doing this is called
MULTIPLE GROUP FACTOR ANALYSIS, which will be discussed in Section 2.5.
We would desire to confirm the assumptions that our "hypothetical"
FACTORS (F.) exist and additionally to estimate (or at least find a
reasonable approximation) from out^ data how ELEMENTS affect FACTORS. In
the first instance, if this does not turn out to be the case, it may not
be of major consequence as a re-definition of FACTORS should be possible.
As regards the division of VALUES (v.) for the ELEMENTS, if for any
reason the results obtained are incompatible (in some sense) or are
obviously not usable, more serious difficulties are probably involved.
These could conceivably range anywhere from biased methods of estimating
v. to totally inappropriate definitions of ELEMENTS. (It is to be noted
that this use of factor analysis, as proposed, appears in harmony with
the uses described in the literature. The technique was originally
designed to measure (describe) psychological variables; the use here in
the measurement of subjective (psychological) values is analogous.)
Analysis conducted on the Unit Command's mission and operational
characteristics is suggested as normally leading to definition of






) , were given.
2.3 OBTAINING ELEMENTS
One primary input is necessary for determining the ELEMENTS.
This input is the result of the military system analysis. (As this
model has proposed establishing the FACTORS (F.) in advance, the use of
the "i" and "j" notation is consistent.) The analyst ultimately obtains
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e (goals, requirements, etc., supra
. Section 1.4.B) from operations
analysis in light of the UC mission; from already existing requirements
established by MC or HC; from mathematical analysis; or by subjective
methods. The e.. are the ELEMENTS of F. which exhibit the UC's opera-
ij i v
tional readiness in the F. dimension. Once the e. . are defined,
i ij
attention can be directed to the VALUES v. corresponding to each e...
Emphasis must be placed on identifying the "set of e. . that are
essential"; temptations to define "too many" e.. should be avoided. It
may be that the particular military system under study has previously
established a variety of requirements by the direction or instruction
of higher authority (or by self-initiation) . t This data will provide a
wide base to commence the search for the significant e... In general,
defining (establishing) ELEMENTS in quantified terms will be desirable
if possible, avoiding qualitative description so as to facilitate the
procurement of the VALUES. The obtaining of ELEMENTS in the manner
proposed is consistent with the planning involved in seeking any
objective in any field (e.g., in the business world, management seeks to
plan their operations, training, production, etc., in light of making
profit). Essentially, it involves (systematically) establishing all of
the intermediate goals, requirements, qualifications, etc., subject to
certain constraints, that must be achieved at specified levels before
any hope of attaining the end result (capability to do the mission) may
be realized. Specifically, one approaches any task by first defining
what that task must be comprised of in its most elementary (fundamental)
aspects.
tit is likely that both cases cited will exist.
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2. 3. A. MINIMUMS ON ELEMENTS (m.). For any time period "At" that
the Index scheme prescribes as a "Performance Evaluation Interval," a
given Unit (UC L ) will accomplish each e.. to a measurable extent,K !J
i.e., UC ' will have "some" degree of success in attaining each goal,
e... UC Tr '' will do so either in full, partially or not at all. Thisij K
is the general case, and the degree to which the Unit attains each e..
is a "performance level " which is a percentage denoted b.:(0-b.-l). The
"j" subscripts correspond. In certain circumstances, depending on the
character of a particular ELEMENT, e. .*, it may be necessary to establish
minimum conditions such that if the minimum prescribed level of perform-
ance in e..* is not achieved during At, special notification, report,
etc., to the Major Command is necessary. These minimums should be
specified for each e.. e
Define MINIMUM CONDITION :
m. e The lowest acceptable performance level for b.(O-m.-l).
J J J
The subscripts correspond to ELEMENTS "j". The m. set





As an example of minimum performance levels and utilizing the
previous illustration of the ASW squadron, consider the following: Let
e„_ = Average aircraft availability for the reporting period: 80%.
Additionally, specify 60% as a "minimum condition" on the performance
level. In this example, total accomplishment of e
?
~ means the squadron's
aircraft availability remains 80% or more. And the minimum condition iiu
equals 60%. Therefore the "performance level" b„ is bounded on the
interval (,6-b -1.0). For performance level (0-b~<.6) the squadron will
have to report the circumstances to the Major Command giving all the




. To facilitate the defining and VALUE
estimation process of e.., a "Priorities List" may prove useful. It
may be established by sorting the e.. as follows:
1. Items e.
.
of F. which are mandatory for OP.R.«b. has positive




2. Items e.. of F. which significantly enhance OP.R.'b. hasij i 6 » >j
non-negative lower bound m..
J
3. Lesser items e. . of F. which reflect OP.R. but for which the
lower bound m. on b. is zero.
J J
The list of a Priorities List will, in general, depend upon the
complexity of the system.
2.4. VALUATION (v.) OF ELEMENTS (e..)
The definition and purpose of assigning VALUES v. were given in
Section I.4.C. Further mention of the purpose of assigning value to
ELEMENTS was made in Section 2.1.
The v. will constitute the most intricate part of Index analysis.
It will not be straightforward in most cases. There is a body of
literature devoted to the measurement of relative values. The content
will not be reproduced here; however, several suggested means of
approaching the value problem will be given. The following methods of




1. Analysis staff estimation of v. (by the analysis personnel).
2. Unit Command estimate of v. (participation by selected
individuals, groups or the entire Unit).
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3. Expert estimates of v. (selected personnel of known reputa-
tion in the TYPE Unit being Indexed, e.g., TYPE ASW) . -
4. Combined estimates of v. (from 1, 2, or 3).
Depending upon the method of inquiry, the VALUES that result may
possibly serve to substantiate or to reject the choice of a particular
ELEMENT e..*, e.g., if the VALUE estimation process turns out to have
ij
assigned uniformly negligible VALUES (weights) to some e..*, then it may
be that e..* does not "significantly reflect" readiness capability in
the Unit at all e Analysts may note either substantiation of e. * in some
sense or rejection of e..* in some sense during the VALUE estimating
process. Again depending upon the inquiry methods, new ELEMENTS may be
discovered that were not previously considered, e.g., if the inquiry is
conducted throughout "many" Units, leading questions may be asked which
seek participant responses concerning ELEMENTS.
VALUE estimation process is the term used here to label blanketly
the procedure that confronts all cognizant members of the MC-UC relation-
ship with the task of actually specifying what is important in terms of
defined missions. It is a process that requires participants to
establish which particular requirements, goals, etc., must be achieved
to satisfy the dictates of the mission. It is only logical to assume
that certain requirements (ELEMENTS) are more important than others.
However, if it turns out that they are not, so be it; the objective has
been to demand that individuals within the military system concerned
(those most closely associated with the requirements and problems
involved) provide their subjective determinations of which requirements
are important and in what relationship. (Note that side benefits may
be derived from such a process in that once certain requirements, goals,
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etc., have been specified as vital, any externally imposed circumstances
preventing the Unit Commands from pursuing these requirements are justi-
fication for close scrutiny and investigation by the MC and/or HC as to




VALUE estimation in the Index scheme should be a dynamic process.
The need exists for periodic updating of an Index just as it does for
any other aspect of modern military operations. Updating of the entire
scheme would also be required after major changes in equipment,
redesignation of missions and objectives, or any time the Unit Command's
military orientation shifts.
Appendix I discusses some of the concepts involved with the
VALUE estimation process entailed in Index scheme development.
2.5. FACTOR ANALYSIS
In Section I.4.D., a brief illustration of the Operational Readi-
ness Index for an ASW squadron was given. The relationship between
FACTORS and ELEMENTS was defined in Section I.4.B. In Section 2.2
mention was made of the fact that we desire to establish the "effect"
of e. . upon F.. It is clear that ELEMENTS may affect (belong to) more
than one FACTOR. A procedure that suggests itself as a possible
(partial) resolution of this difficulty is the technique FACTOR ANALYSIS.
Within the theory of factor analysis there exists a variety of
specific techniques or methods for determining descriptive FACTORS
(characteristics) from a set of data. Such techniques include Principal
Component Analysis, Bi-Factor Analysis, the Centroid Method, etc. As
this paper is a basic study of operational readiness for military force
posture and not a survey of the techniques of scientific factor analysis,
only one method has been chosen for illustration . That method is called
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MULTIPLE GROUP FACTOR ANALYSIS ,, It has been chosen solely on intuitive
grounds as it appears to provide a reasonable approach to the task of
estimating ELEMENT influence upon the FACTORS F.. This is not to say
that in fact some other method (as above) may be more appropriate in a
given set of conditions* Additionally, none of these techniques has
been tested empirically by this author.
The following discussion concerns the assumptions behind Multiple
Group Factor Analysis when applied to the readiness problem.
At this point a distinct departure from the notation of ELEMENTS
will be made. The subscript "_i" will be dropped from the e.
.
(becoming
e.) for reasons that should shortly become clear as the "group" concept
of Multiple Group Factor Analysis is illustrated. (For other factor
analysis methods it may be useful to retain the double subscripts on
the ELEMENTS; for the multiple group solution this is unnecessary.)




...,F ) as FACTORS
for the Unit Command being Indexed „ They have defined "L" requirements
(ELEMENTS) to exist, viz,, (e
,
e„,...,e ). Furthermore, from surveys
similar (in nature) to that depicted in FIGURE 3.6, assume that they
have been able to "group" ELEMENTS belonging to FACTORS. Assume that
the results of the survey have revealed some overlapping of the groups
of e. but , for the purpose of this illustration , a "clear enough"
distinction exists among the groups of e. that the analysts are justified
in arranging the sets in a non-overlapping manner. Furthermore, they
have specified "r" groups of e.'s, i.e., they have partitioned the set
of e.'s into "r" uniquely distinct groups. (Note that although a "clear
enough" distinction among the ELEMENTS exists so that unique grouping
is possible, this does not necessarily imply that a particular ELEMENT
will affect only the FACTOR that it is grouped with.)
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e : Requirement for 75% of Pilots to be
Qualified in ASW Tactics
For Research
Personnel Only
Check the appropriate box that best describes your
estimation of the importance of e (above) with
respect to the mission of your squadron.
"I consider e (above) ..."
1. Mandatory for Ops Readiness
2. Essential for Ops Readiness
3. Important for Ops Readiness
4. Fairly Important for Ops Readiness
5. Concerns Ops Readiness Somehow











"With respect to Operational Readiness, e




3. Squadron Personnel Capabilities








The diagram depicts the notions involved in a VALUE estimation process
(not necessarily indicating a preferable survey technique)
.
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Multiple Group Factor Analysis begins from the assumptions given
in the preceding paragraph.
During the VALUE estimation process each of the "n" Unit Commands
(for example, the various ASW squadrons) has furnished its estimate of
v. for all i. Denote these "estimates" as v.„. These are "observed"
3 JK
estimates for the "n" Unit Commands, UC , (K=l,...,n). Estimates
are required from each command in order to use factor analysis techniques
(of any variety) since they depend upon statistical methods. (In the
literature of factor analysis, these estimates are considered "test
scores.") As each Unit Command has provided estimates v. Tr , form the




J n ^ jK'
? (The circumflex denotes
an average value of v .)
As previously defined, v. is the VALUE (weight) awarded to the Unit
Commands for totally accomplishing ELEMENT e.. After the VALUE estima-
tion process this VALUE (v.) is given numerically by v. (as above).
The utility of applying factor analysis is that from information
contained in the "set of estimates" (v 's) we desire to estimate
(approximate) how the quantity v. is to be distributed among the
FACTORS (F.) according to the influence that e. has upon F.. v. will be
divided into "r" parts, i.e., some percent (denoted: p..j^0) of v. will
be assigned to each F. though that percent may be zero for one or more
F.. Referring to the ASW squadron, where r=3, and F , F„ and F_ were
defined along with e
,
let v =10 and p =25%, p =75% and p =0%. Then
if goal e.. (using the notation of this section where the "i" was omitted)
was satisfied completely according to its definition, the ASW squadron
would receive weight 2.5 for F
1
,
7.5 for F_, and for F_.
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The purpose of all this is to take the ELEMENTS e., establish
* J
their VALUE (quantified as v.), which permits comparison, and group them
into "r" groups; and hence by Multiple Group Factor Analysis approximate
the division of each v. among the FACTORS F..
The Unit Command estimates (v ) form a Lxn matrix denoted by V.
(See FIGURE AI-2 of Appendix I.) This is the raw data for L statistical
variables (the v.) for the n Unit Commands. The row-wise ELEMENTS of
the V matrix may be considered the coordinates of L points v. (j=l,...,L)
in an n-space. Alternatively, these L points may be called "vectors."
Then the L variables have a vector representation given by
2.5.(1) v = (v , v
2
, ..., v ) j=l,...,L
The data from matrix V can be reduced to standard form and
correlation coefficients computed among the variables. t This is normally
done before a factor analysis computation.
Denote the standardized variables of V as a matrix Z.
Z = (z ) where,
v. - v.
_j a.
' y - - 2
K=l jK j
T
The product of Z by its transpose Z is equal to the correlation
matrix multiplied by the scalar n (for the "n" Unit Commands).
T IT
ZZ = nR or, R = - ZZ
n
tThe discussion of factor analysis presented here is drawn




Factor analysis is concerned with suitably choosing appropriate
main diagonal ELEMENTS (replacing the usual "ones") such that a matrix
R^ is obtained.
t
Factor analysis computations then obtain the matrix A such that
^ = AA
T
, ^ = ^
where A=(a..) is an (Lxr) matrix called a factor pattern and R^ is a
reproduced correlation matrix with element by element approximations for










= \ " *D »
"satisfies" the analyst. The factor pattern A=(a..), (Lxr), is the
matrix of coordinates for the variables v. within the FACTOR space
J
F , ...,F . Therefore, equation 2.5.(1) has a vector representation in
the r-space given by
2.5.(2) v * = (a.
1 ,
a 2> ..., a>),
v.* =\ a,.f. + a.„f„ + ... + a.
j 1 jl 1 j2 2 2
or H ^f, - , - - f"
r
j=l,...,L,
tThese values are called "communalities" in the factor analysis
literature.
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where: 1) the f . are the same unit dimension vectors given in Section
1.4.D, and 2) the a., are the scalar elements of a matrix A (Lxr) dis-
cussed above.
t
It is acknowledged that this discussion of the theory of factor
analysis has been far from rigorous or complete; in fact, much has been
omitted for the sake of brevity. The purpose has been to give the
reader a brief notion of the concepts involved, not to offer a precise
formulation for computing the A matrix. For a complete, detailed and
rigorous presentation of the entire theory and computational methods
the reader is referred to Modern Factor Analysis (see Bibliography) from
which this discussion was drawn.
Recall we desire to divide v. into "r" parts according to e.'s
"effect" upon F.. Now it may be observed that there exists a correspond-
ence between the vector v. (equation 2.5.(1)) and the scalar average
estimate v.. If we assume that there exists an approximate one to one
correspondence between the factor coefficients (the a., of equation
2.5.(2)) and the manner in which v. should be distributed (divided) into
the "r" percentages (p..>0) then the a„. will indicate how this distribu-
j 1- 3 i
tion (division) might be carried out.
Before leaving this discussion of factor analysis two points
(concerning the subject) bear mentioning. These points relate to the (at
present) most subjective aspects of factor analysis.
tThe coefficients a., in equation 2.5.(2) are implied to be
orthogonal coefficients of-1 the f.. In a factor analysis computation
this may consist of a transformation from an initial "oblique solution"
to an orthogonal system.
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1. First, the attempt made in this paper has been to derive
information about the "underlying constructs" which have been defined
here as FACTORS F , but it must be emphasized that
There is no search for timeless, spaceless, populationless
truth in Factor Analysis; rather, it represents a simple straight-
forward problem of description in several dimensions of a definite
group functioning in definite manners, and he who assumes to read
more remote verities into„the factorial outcome is certainly
doomed to disappointment.
In other words, the general approach in this paper has been
establishing, a priori, the FACTOR space—that this should be the case
seems intuitively appealing; however, the results of surveys (VALUE
estimation processes) as sketched in this paper may reveal that
ELEMENTS are providing information concerning more than (or less than)
the original hypothesized FACTORS (F.). Only data from specific surveys
can answer a given hypothesis. (It is stated once again that no
empirical analysis has been conducted by this author to in fact conclude
that VALUE estimation and factor analysis can be linked together in the
general form proposed in this paper, although every indication (by
analogy) in the literature seems to reveal promise.)
2. The second point to mention concerns possible additional
orthogonal rotations of the A matrix. Often, an initial factor solution
provides only a stepping stone to "more desirable" multiple factor solu-
tions. (This is, in general, an accepted concept discussed in factor
analysis literature.) As there is latitude for subjective determination
of what constitutes a "more desirable" solution, a method has been
proposed by the scientific community prof essionally engaged with factor
analysis to definitize mathematically "more desirable" solutions. This
3
method is the varimax solution (varimax criterion). It has been
developed by Kaiser and is presently available for use on high speed
digital computers.
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2.6. OPERATIONAL READINESS INDEX
2. 6. A. OPTIMAL INDEX . We assume that factor analysis has
provided a set of coefficients a..(0<a..<l) that indicate how the
j i - j i-
partitioning of v. into percentages is carried out. As we are assuming




F_,...,F ) defined in Section 1.4.D, the percentages p.. ( supra .










where cos (a..) are the direction cosines of v.*, when considered as a
vector in "r" space as in equation 2.5.(2). (See FIGURE 3.7.) Hence,
each estimate v. is divided into "r" parts, each of the form {n..(v.)}
assigned to the corresponding FACTOR "i".
Recalling the discussion of Section 1.4.D, (where F * and F.'
were introduced as scalars for the "optimum condition" and Unit Command
"posture," respectively, for FACTOR i) , we may now form the scalar sum
for each, constructed from the v. scalars. Let
3
L
2.6.A.U) V = I (pji^V = PliVl + p 2iV 2 + '•• + PLiV
"j" indexes the weights v. for completely satisfying e.. Each ELEMENT
"j" gives some percent of its weight to each FACTOR where that percent
may range from 0% to 100%.
Equation 2.6.A.(1) defines the maximum VALUE that a Unit Command
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1
by using 2.6.A.(1) where the ASW squadron was assumed to have r=3
FACTORS
.
2.6.B. UNIT POSTURE . During the time interval over which unit
performance is measured, the ASW squadron will achieve a set of perform-
ance levels (numbers) "b." (0£b.<L) of Section 2.3.B. Then the scalar
sum for the Unit Command POSTURE in FACTOR "i" (viz., F ' of Section
1.4.D) may be formed as
2.6.B.U) V - I <b >(p )(v ) «,...3=1 -J -J J
Therefore, the Unit Command POSTURE evaluated at "t" ( R^
ASW)
)
will be the "particular" set (primes) of performance levels (b . ' ) for






i=l j/V^^v] f t





assigned to each ELEMENT, then for any b.'<m., reports must be
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forwarded to the Major Command giving details of the unsatisfactory
performance.
2.6.C CRITERION . The criterion for specifying the minimum
readiness posture R
. ( supra , Section 1.4.D) will necessarily ber mm —c— '
determined from the circumstances peculiar to the given situation, just
as minimum conditions "m." ( supra , Section 2.3.B) are peculiar to the
given situation. Three types of criterion are readily available
(whether they are applicable to a specific case is another question)
.
1. Magnitude and Direction Criterion
2. Magnitude (only) Criterion
3. FACTOR Criterion (and extension)
„, rj . c „(ASW) , /±(ASW)x . a r .The first criterion states that R . = h(R ) is definedmm opt
(u and 3 are given) by:
(ASW)
(ASW). i£(ASW)
( h(R^ ; ) = y|R^ ; |, 0<y<ll v opt ' opt ' '
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ig ^^ READY .
y and 6 are criterion parameters that must be established by the
analysis staff. The parameters determine the degree of latitude that
the Index permits for acceptable Unit performance. In essence, the
relations 2.6.C.(1) and (la) define parameterized measures of effective-







defines two conditions (h.. and h n ) that the Unitmm 1 2
Commands must satisfy to be classified READY and "g" defines the
appropriate manner (g.. and g_) for making the comparisons.
The first criterion establishes the requirement for a UC to
perform at a certain level and additionally to balance its military
operations among the FACTORS.
The second criterion is equation 2.6.C.(1) for "h " only and
again the relations g-.ilh and g <h determine READINESS ratings. The
second criterion specifies that a certain "level" of operation is
necessary to maintain (at least) a desired OPERATIONAL READINESS minimum.
The FACTOR criterion restricts the performance of each UC " to
at least a certain minimum level in each F.. The restriction is given
l
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by F.'>c.F.* for all "i", where F.* is the "optimum of FACTOR i "
1 — 11 1 '
0<c <1, and F ' is the Unit's "POSTURE" in FACTOR i at reporting period
"t". An extension of this criterion can be established in conjunction
with the minimum conditions for ELEMENTS (0_<m.<L) defined in Section
2. 3. A. This would imply that Units must not only satisfy criterion (3)
to be operationally ready but must also comply with all of the lower
bounded conditions imposed by all defined m.. This is a more stringent
criterion and requires that each UC must satisfy to a specific
K




The discussion of this chapter thus far has closely followed the
philosophy developed in the previous two chapters regarding operational
readiness and its measurement. The Index model as designed provides a
basis for determining POSTURE by comparison of performance levels with
clearly defined goals. Several criteria have been offered to permit
comparison as dictated by the specific circumstances of a given case.
It remains to be established how the Index can provide information to
the Major Command concerning POSTURE and deficiencies that may exist.
First, POSTURE information to the MC is directly available from
(T)




are "ready" within the context of defined goals. By definition any
performance levels (b.) which have not satisfied the minimum conditions
(m.) must be reported through the proper channels to the proper
authority. Secondly, if the Index is satisfied, staff readiness analysts
may tell from the Index not only that the Units are ready, but just as
importantly, that all defined ELEMENTS are being satisfied. We have a
compact set of numbers that reveal the degree of readiness POSTURE and
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additionally indicate that all specified readiness indicators (the
ELEMENTS) are being met. The value of such information is obvious.
Thirdly, by charting readiness Index POSTURES over time a clear picture
of the readiness domain is available. For a given Unit type that has
widespread (among most or many of the TYPE T Units) and common problem
areas, one will observe consistently low F ' values. For F„ = ASW
1 3
Squadron Personnel, if F ' is consistently low for all (or many) of the
UC , this will indicate immediately that a problem area exists and
what that area consists of. It is assumed that by further investigation
into the performance levels (b.) affecting F , the trouble may be
further isolated. Thus, plans
,
programs , etc., for correction may be
initiated. We find, then, that the Index (as developed) has within its
framework a definite means for measurement and the subsequent determina-
tion of correction when needed.
In regard to planning for operations, supply and logistics needs,
etc., the Index provides a systematic method of approach. We have
assumed that it was possible to specify (by means of the VALUE estima-
tion process) which ELEMENTS demanded the most attention with respect
to readiness posture. Having established the importance of an ELEMENT
it is possible to utilize these VALUES (V.) to plan what resources are
needed for Unit operations in general or to plan how they may be used
if given. These conditions (established by the model) lend themselves
quite easily to a programming scheme.





,L) . (For programming, the subscript "i" is not
required on ELEMENTS.) Let v. be the VALUE of e. as before. Assume
3 3
that resources of a specified type (kind) are allocated at a level B,
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(k=l,...,s). There are "s" (s_<L) commensurable types of resources.
These could be dollars, flight hours, weapons, man-hours available,
training-hours available, etc. Further, define c,
.
as a "unit cost"
(in the programming sense) incurred for obtaining the requirements,
goals, etc., defined for e„. The subscript k corresponds to subscripts
of B, . These "unit costs" could be in terms of flight hours per pilot
(or crew) to maintain a qualification, dollars per weapon, dollars per
aircraft flight hour, hours of training required for a qualification,
or man-hours for maintenance, etc. The objective, as before, is to
maximize readiness posture. This can be done by maximizing performance
levels (b
. ) ( supra , equation 2.6.B.(1)). Hence, maximize the sum of
»> 3
v.x.. The program is formulated (in principle) as:
L ^
max { / v.x.}
x. j=l J J
J




where: C = matrix of "unit costs"; C=(c ) (sxL)
x = vector of levels to be determined (Lxl)
B 5 vector of resources allocated (sxl)
m = vector of minimum conditions (m.) for performance levels
(supra, Section 2, 3. A)
= the null vector
It may be that certain elements of C will be zero where e.* is not
concerned with some particular resource (and therefore not concerned
with that "unit cost"). Also, it may be the case that some e.* are not
defined in terms of resources; in such a case the dimensions of the
program are accordingly reduced.
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The solution yields a set of x. that determine what performance
J
->
levels are optimal for the given resource level B. It may be that a
-*
-* -*
given B will not be consistent for the m constraining x; in this case,
clearly, the resources have been allocated at a level insufficient to
establish maximum readiness. In effect, this says that if there is no
feasible solution for the program, the resource level B is not
sufficient. Additionally, by allowing B to vary while holding C constant,
one may determine what B is required to obtain the optimal F.*, or simply,
L
X
what B* is required for I v., since B* will determine x. at 100% for all
j=l J J
j. Of course, this is not to say that the Units will perform at a
maximum capability; actual performances b. are subject to all of the
variability of military operations. In short, the x. are performances
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper is based upon the thesis that a continuing effort must
be exerted to increase operational readiness evaluation methods so that
correction of deficiencies (discrepancies) can be made as higher readi-
ness levels are sought. The effort here has been to assist in pointing
the way. The analysis has specifically endeavored to "search" behind
military readiness in the effort to discover "why" and "what" we are
attempting to measure. The reasons for this are obvious; before
attempting measurement of any sort, knowledge concerning purpose most
often leads to method. Additionally, an exploration to probe the readi-
ness measurement frontier was conducted by searching for sophisticated
techniques that attempt direct measurement of what the man in the field
is capable of doing with his given weapon system.
READINESS MEASUREMENT
1. The two major roles played by the military forces, viz.,
deterrence and local (limited) war suppression, continue to demand
readiness measurement schemes of the highest capacity due to the fact
that military posture in these roles has a vital effect on:
a. United States foreign policy
b. The policy and objectives of foreign nations
c. Subsequent strategic threat analysis conducted by
military defense planners
d. Military planning and operations
2. For readiness measurement schemes that attempt direct measure-
ment of unit (force) capabilities to carry out the assigned (defined)
missions, accurate threat analysis is vital. This leads to the obvious
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conclusion that the preponderance of effort involved in defense planning
must be done in the initial threat analysis phases. It is immeasurably
more important to devote time, effort and money to threat analysis in
order to determine proper forces (and levels) than to attempt detailed
measurement of force capabilities where "threats" are inaccurately
assessed. Ideally, thorough and complete threat analysis is followed by
thorough and complete force capability measurement.
3. Operational readiness measurement schemes must attempt to
measure
a. Capability to counter the threat (combat potential)
b. Expenditure of allocated resources (efficiencies)
c. Use of men and machines (system utilization and
materiel condition)
It is concluded by this writer that the most efficient means of
doing this is by comparing explicitly defined goals, requirements,
objectives, etc., with observed postures so that corrections can be
made when and where needed, (This is quite consistent with the
planning of any major undertaking; one determines and satisfies the
intermediate conditions required before broader objectives can be
realized.
)
4. Readiness measurement schemes must be dynamic in nature.
They should be so developed that the system being measured for readiness
is an integral part of a total system which continues to evaluate threat,
define goals, innovate and systematically pursue increased capabilities.
OPERATIONAL READINESS INDEX MODEL
1. The OPERATIONAL READINESS INDEX model developed has in a
general (but consistent) fashion incorporated the philosophy developed
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in Chapters I and II (summarized in 1-4 above) . Whether such an evalua-
tion scheme would be applicable in the exact form given (to include
value measurement and factor analysis) could be determined only from
further study as no empirical data were obtainable for analysis (due
to the nature of the proposed method) . The scheme would be applicable
in any case, only under the assumptions (underscored) in Chapter III.
Experts in the fields of operations analysis, value measurement and
factor analysis would be required. A computer facility is fundamental.
2. The model as developed provides a general theoretical and
exploratory framework for prospective readiness measurement schemes.
The broad concepts of readiness factors, readiness elements (indicators),
values (effectiveness weights), performance minimums, performance levels,
etc. , are germane and clearly applicable in concept to any scheme
purporting to measure directly readiness.
3. The model in concept is clearly usable (even by individual
Unit Commands) whether value measurement or factor analysis is available
or not. This is due to the fact that the model demands in a fundamental
way that analysis be conducted concerning the tasks and requirements
which are essential for mission success; that priorities be assigned;
and the minimum acceptable levels (for a "READY" rating) be set. At
the very least this entails a commanding officer in conjunction with
staff officers 1) examining in detail all aspects of unit operations
which directly affect readiness, and 2) systematically pursuing the
resulting tasks to obtain the desired posture. The greater the input
of effort and analysis the more nearly the Index model will be
approached.
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It is hoped that this paper has placed sufficient emphasis on the
fact that readiness evaluation schemes should ideally compare performance
with defined (optimal) standards so that POSTURES may be increased. It
is contended that the most fundamental method of doing this is by
measuring the current capabilities of men-within-sys terns , insofar as
possible, so that measured deficiencies can be recognized and corrected





The objective of this Appendix is to amplify the discussion of
Section 2.4 of Chapter III. The VALUES necessary for the establishment
of the Operational Readiness Index constitute a direct appeal to the
theory of utility. At first this may seem to be a restriction that
could cause a quantified Index scheme to be biased. May we first reply
by stating that the entire process of readiness measurement is contingent
in varying degrees upon the measurement of subjective values. The
decisions rendered at even the highest levels concerning strategic
threat analysis are to a substantial degree dependent upon subjectivity
(concerning either data or decisions). There is simply no known way to
avoid it. We state that until a superior method is developed, the
techniques of utility theory, if not entirely satisfactory, nevertheless
can be adequate and indeed quite useful.
The "VALUATION" process suggested for use in this model embraces
an opinion expressed in the literature on value measurement which
contends that in certain cases a better "feel" for relative value can
be derived from group estimations. Section 2.4, Chapter III, offered
methods for obtaining the v.. Essentially these methods implied that
the search for the v. be conducted from as large an input body as is
considered reliable. The greater the number of estimates of the relative
value (importance) of success in a given defined requirement or goal
(e..), logically the greater will be the probability of accurately
establishing the importance of each e... It should be definitely
established that the true "worth" (value) of accomplishing any defined
goal is not obtainable. But this is not of direct concern; we may
83
appreciate this fully by realizing that we are attempting to estimate
the relative importance of conducting certain tasks, i.e., the tasks or
requirements specified in definitive terms as being necessary for the
particular military unit to attain a combat-ready posture.
At this point it should be made clear that the use of the
techniques of factor analysis are specifically dependent upon statistical
methods. For this reason the model, incorporating factor analysis as
developed, is dependent on obtaining a broad base of estimates from the
reliable sources at hand concerning the relative VALUES v.. As the
model is designed for the case where "numerous" units of the same TYPE
are involved, this should present no major obstacle with respect to
sources. (Supra , Chapter III, Section 1.2.)
We seek a set of numerical values that estimate the relative
importance of the e. . FIGURE AI-1 is a Flow Diagram that depicts the
procedural flow of events that lead to the "VALUATION" process. The
dash-enclosed block at the top of the diagram represents the analysis
phase in which the missions and objectives are analyzed. In this phase
HC, MC, and UC make contributions to the analysis. Complete liaison
between all parties is mandatory in order that all significant aspects
of the mission are revealed . This is depicted by the feedback loops
that appear. Three parallel processes are implied in the lower block.
The first is an estimating process that renders equal importance to
each input received. The other two are processes in which weights may
(or may not) be attached to each input corresponding to the importance
of that estimate as subjectively determined by the analysis staff
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INDEX ANALYSIS STAFF obtains
FACTORS (F.) by analyzing:
1. Major Command and Unit Command
mission and objectives as set
by the direction of High Commanjl
2. The Military Organizational
Structure
.
3. The Military System as exempli^










1. The FACTORS as above.
2. The Unit Command as it exists.




INDEX ANALYSIS STAFF designs
VALUE estimating schemes.
1. Schemes for v. from the
population of^UC.
2. Schemes for v. from selected
groups of UC personnel.
3. Schemes for v. from "experts."
J
The dashed line encloses the phase of
Index analysis which should ideally be
characterized by a maximum of liaison









personnel. t The inputs to the factor analysis computations are the
results of the VALUE estimation process and are symbolically depicted
at the lower right of the diagram.
The VALUE estimation process will yield from the participants a
set of numerical estimates for each v, according to the individual
participant. For illustration we may say there are three types of data
that can be acquired: First, that of the entire Unit Command; second,
the input of selected groups of individuals within the Unit Command;
and lastly, the inputs from experts. We will expand these notions some-
what for clarity. For some e„.* it may be that only data from experts
will be considered pertinent and reliable, whereas for e..' a combina-
tion of group estimations and expert estimation is desired. In short,
VALUES of various ELEMENTS will be estimated from the different sources
because logically certain sources will inherently be more knowledgeable
of the characteristics of a particular ELEMENT.
It should be pointed out at this time that the number of
individual personnel participating in a VALUE estimation process does
not in itself reduce the utility of the factor analysis computational
technique (under the assumed conditions of "many units"). There will
remain "n" estimates of "L" VALUES. FIGURE AI-2 depicts a matrix of
estimates of v. from the "n" Units Commands of the TYPE being Indexed.
J
,tLet (v..). represent the VALUE rendered to the j
• th jk i v s . T,th TT fJ. „ J1 expert (or group of experts) in the K Unit Commai
ELEMENT by
the i*" ' J T ? ~* nd; now assume
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I (V iK ) i a i ' Ij
1=1 j X X 1=1























*L1 \2 • • • ^Ln
FIGURE AI-2
The figure depicts a matrix of VALUE estimates (v. ) rendered by
the "n" Unit Commands on each of the "L" ELEMENTS. A typical matrix
ELEMENT v may be derived from the following sources:
1. Esimates of v. by personnel of the K Unit Command. This
3
is an average of the individual subjective estimates rendered by the
individual personnel of that command.
,th
2. Estimates of v. by a selected group of individuals within the
K Unit Command. This figure is an average of the subjective estimates
rendered by the individuals of the group.
3. Estimates of v. by experts within the K Unit Command.
A. Lastly, an estimate may be derived from some combination of
the sources given in 1-3.
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The matrix of VALUE estimates (V) shown in FIGURE AI-2 is the
input data for the factor analysis as discussed in Section 2.5 of
Chapter III.
Current work is being done in the field of value estimation.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has experimented with
"balloting" techniques for deciding the relative emphasis NASA should
put on future programs in space science and space utilization. The
technique is called PATTERN—Planning and Evaluation of Relevance
Numbers. The scheme was designed by the Honeywell Military Products
Group. The present scheme uses a Burroughs 5500 with COBOL as the
computer language. Essentially the inputs to the scheme are obtained
through voting ("valuation") sessions where "value" decisions are
rendered in specific areas by cognitive personnel. The salient feature
of the scheme is that participants must defend their ratings and change
them if other personnel can reveal convincing information not previously




Before leaving the subject of VALUE determination for the various
ELEMENTS we acknowledge that the discussion has not specified the
technique to be used for obtaining VALUES in a value-based operational
readiness scheme; it has merely outlined the approach. In a specific
case, certain techniques (e.g. , survey questionnaires versus inter-
views)t may or may not be available. If VALUE estimation is not
feasible for some reason in a specific case, then the Index scheme as
outlined here will not be applicable.
tRegardless of the technique of estimating subjective VALUES, the
approach can be made in an objective manner.^
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IS. ABSTRACT
A theoretical Unit Operational Readiness Index model is developed
after presenting a discussion concerning the implications of military force
readiness evaluation. The theoretical model is designed around subject
measurement of defined military goals. The quantification of defined goals in
the manner proposed suggests the possible use of factor analysis techniques
which are discussed. Although the model has not been empirically tested, it
endeavors to provide a conceptual visualization of unit operational readiness
evaluation and argues for the benefits to be derived from comprehensive
schemes of this general type.
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